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CONSERVING THEIR KINGDOM: HABITAT
MODIFICATION AS A HARM UNDER THE
ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT
I. INTRODUCTION
The need for the Endangered Species Act is clear. Not only are species leaving
our earth that will never return, but the speed at which this extinction is occurring is
alarming. In fact, more than half of the known extinctions over the last 2000 years
occurred during the last 60 years.1 Congress directed its attention to this need in
19662 by passing The Endangered Species Conservation Act giving the Secretary of
the Interior the authority to acquire wildlife habitat lands for preservation.3 Three
years later, Congress gave the Secretary the authority to promulgate a list of species
threatened worldwide with extinction in the Endangered Species Conservation Act of
1969.' Congress embraced the goals of each of these statutes in the Endangered Spe-
cies Act of 1973 (ESA), which clarified ambiguities resulting from the previous stat-
utes and gave the Secretary broader power than its predecessors, such as to define
what acts consitute a violation as well as to list species as endangered.5 It was seen as
the "first federal statute to embody a truly comprehensive federal effort at wildlife
preservation."6 The relevant portions of the ESA for the purposes of this article, em-
bodied in § 9, state that a person subject to the jurisdiction of the United States may
not "take any such [endangered] species within the United States or the territorial sea
of the United States ..... 7 The statute defines the term "take" to mean "to harass,
harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect or to attempt to engage
in any such conduct."' One term causing gfeat confusion is "harm" since it has no
concrete action within its definition. To suppress this confusion, the U.S. Fish and
Wildlife Service (FWS) devised the following definition:
Harm in the definition of "take" in the [ESA] means an act which actually kills or
injures wildlife. Such act may include significant habitat modification or degrada-
tion where it actually kills or injures wildlife by significantly impairing essential
behavioral patterns, including breeding, feeding or sheltering.9
1. Mark Sagoff, On the Preservation of Species, 7 COLUM. J. ENvTL. L. 33, 42-45 (1980).
2. Congress had previously enacted statutes aimed at specific species such as The Migratory Bird
Treaty Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 703-712 (1982) (enacted 1918); The Bald and Golden Eagles Protection Act,
16 U.S.C. §§ 668-668d (1982) (enacted 1940). See also Saxe, infra note 22 for a history of species
conservation in the United States.
3. Pub. L. No. 89-669, §§ 1-3, 80 Stat. 926 (repealed 1973).
4. Pub. L. No. 91-135, 83 Stat. 275 (§§ 1-6 repealed 1973) (remainder codified as amended in
scattered sections of 16 U.S.C. and 18 U.S.C.).
5. Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-44 (1994).
6. Michael J. Bean, The Evolution of National Wildlife Law 319 (rev. ed. 1983).
7. 16 U.S.C. § 1538 (a)(l)(B) (1994).
8. 16 U.S.C. § 1532 (19) (1994).
9. 50 C.F.R. 17.3 (1994) (emphasis added).
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The term "harm" and the FWS definition of it have created a great struggle between
private property rights advocates and environmentalists.
Environmentalists seemed to be prevailing in this struggle since even before the
FWS codified the inclusion of habitat modification in its definition of harm, courts
interpreted habitat modification as a taking, citing the overall intent of the ESA."0 The
Ninth Circuit held in Palila v. Hawaii Dept. of Natural Resources, also known as
Palila IV, that the release of sheep that ultimately destroyed the mamane trees, those
depended upon by an endangered species, was a taking." The court reached its deci-
sion by defining this destruction as habitat modification and interpreting it as a harm
since it depleted the already small population. Even as recent as 1993, the DC Circuit
upheld this interpretation in Sweet Home v. Babbitt (Sweet Home ).2 However, in
March, 1994, the DC Circuit overruled this decision and decided in Sweet Home 11 that
the FWS incorrectly included habitat modification as a harm resulting in a taking of an
endangered species. 3 The DC Circuit found the regulation to be unconstitutional
since it went against the intent of Congress. Thus, the DC Circuit created a split be-
tween itself and the Ninth Circuit. 4 While environmental advocates in the Ninth Cir-
cuit believe the decision in Sweet Home 11 simply does not apply in that part of the
country and is therefore insignificant, it represents a difference that has the dangerous
potential to cost the nation valuable natural resources."
The primary effects of the split are twofold. First, it promises to add fire to the
arguments of private property owners. 6 This will increase the current heavy load of
litigation concerning compensation for property owners whose land loses value due to
a government regulation such as the FWS inclusion of habitat modification. Second,
and more importantly, the split may have a deleterious effect on conservation efforts.
With the DC decision, the habitats of endangered species lose their significance under
the weight of private property owners' rights." With habitats no longer protected,
endangered species lose their foundations and, in turn, their "essential behavior pat-
terns, including breeding, feeding or sheltering" as referred to by FWS.' s Without
appropriate habitats, the species lose their terrain and methods by which they can re-
cover to the point of removal from the endangered list, the basic goal of putting spe-
cies on the list.
10. Palila v. Hawaii Dept. of Land & Natural Resources, 852 F.2d 1106 (9th Cir. 1988).
11. Id.
12. Sweet Home v. Babbitt, 1 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1993) [hereinafter Sweet home 1].
13. Sweet Home v. Babbitt, 17 F.3d 1463 (D.C. Cir. 1994) [hereinafter Sweet Home 11].
14. The DC Circuit is joined by the Eight Circuit in Sierra Club v. Froehlke, 534 F.2d 1289 (8th
Cir. 1976) (building of a dam was not an attempt to harass or harm the species and thereby did not
violate § 9 of ESA). The Ninth Circuit is joined by the Fifth Circuit in Sierra Club v. Yeutter, 926
F.2d 429 (5th Cir. 1991) (Forest Service's practices violated ESA by impairing the endangered
woodpecker's essential behavioral patterns, including sheltering); and in National Wildlife Federation v.
Coleman, 529 F.2d 359 (5th Cir. 1976) (Under § 7 of ESA, actions of federal agency must not jeop-
ardize the continued existence of the Mississippi Sandhill Crane); and by the Sixth Circuit in Hill v.
Tennesee Valley Authority, 549 F.2d 1064 (6th Cir. 1977), aff'd in Tennesee Valley Authority v. Hill,
437 U.S. 153 (1978) (see infra note 24 and accompanying text).
15. Todd Woody, D.C. Environmental Ruling Creates Split in Circuits, THE RECORDER, March 17,
1994.
16. See infra note 51. See also Lynda Graham Cook, Comment. Lucas & Endangered Species
Protection: When "Take" and "Takings" Collide, 27 U.C. DAViS L. REV. 185 (1993).
17. Id.
18. 50 C.F.R. 17.3 (1994).
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In addition to the increased number of extinct species, the decision to preclude
habitat modification from the definition of harm runs contrary to the moral foundation
of our country. Robert Dworkin notes that
in our culture, we tend to treat distinct animal species as sacred. We think it very
important, and worth considerable economic expense, to protect endangered species
from destruction at human hands or by a human enterprise .... We consider it a
kind of cosmic shame when a species that nature has developed ceases, through
human actions, to exist.'9
Not only will one species cease to exist, but the ecosystem to which the species
was formerly a member will be damaged. In fact, the purpose of the bill includes "the
conservation of the species and of the ecosystems upon which they depend. ... "'
The term "ecosystem" refers to the concept that "[tihe predatory species evolved side-
by-side with prey species; their mutual dependence is critical to the elusive stasis
called the balance of nature."'" By eliminating one species from the "complex of sub-
tly balanced interrelationships," other species suffer, thereby damaging the ecosystem
as a whole.22 This will in turn prevent the surrounding communities from realizing the
long-term benefits of ecosystem-based management. 3
With these possible results at risk, the split begs for resolution. The Supreme
Court has yet to directly address the split. The Court may be waiting to see the results
of the planned reauthorization of the Endangered Species Act.24 However, the Su-
preme Court may believe it already decided this question in Tennessee Valley Authori-
ty v. Hill.'5 In this controversial case, involving the endangered snail darter, the Sec-
retary of the Interior, under authority of § 7, listed the area surrounding the almost-
completed multi-million dollar Tellico Dam as the fish's critical habitat. The Court
relied on the language of the Act stating that "[algencies in particular are directed...
[to] 'use ... all methods and procedures which are necessary' to preserve endangered
species." '26 The Court also stated that "[t]he plain intent of Congress in enacting [the
ESA] was to halt and reverse the trend toward species extinction, whatever the
cost.""7 Whatever the reason, the split is still unresolved and Congress should, in the
upcoming reauthorization, clarify the language of the statute to include habitat modifi-
cation and settle the split.
19. Robert Dworkin, LIFE's DOMINION 75 (1993).
20. 199 Cong. Rec. 42913 (1973). See also 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b) (1994).
21. George C. Coggins & Parthenia B. Evans, Predators' Rights and American Wildlife Law, 24
ARIz. L. REV. 821, 824 (1982).
22. Keith Saxe, Regulated Taking of Threatened Species Under the Endangered Species Act, 39
HASTINGs L.J. 399, 403 (1988).
23. Robert B. Keiter, Beyond the Boundary Line: Constructing a Law of Ecosystem Management,
65 U. CoLO. L. REV. 293, 295 (1994).
24. Nancy Kubasek, et. al., The Endangered Species Act: Time for a New Approach?, 24 ENVTL.
L. 329 (Spring 1994).
25. Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, 437 U.S: 153 (1978).
26. Id. at 185, citing 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531(c), 1532(2) (1976 ed.).
27. Id. at 184 (emphasis added).
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II. THE CONTROVERSY OVER HARM
A. Palila IV: ESA Calls for Habitat Modification as a Harm
The case that best lays out the notion that habitat modification does constitute a
harm, and therefore an illegal taking, is Palila v. Hawaii Dept. of Land & Natural
Resources, also known as Palila IV.2" Here, the Ninth Circuit upheld the district
court's decision in Palila I' to remove mouflon sheep from the critical habitat of the
Palila, a six-inch bird found only on the slopes of Mauna Kea on the Island of Ha-
waii.3" The court found that the sheep, who were introduced to the area by the De-
partment of Land & Natural Resources for the enjoyment of sport hunters, fed upon
and ultimately destroyed the mamane trees upon which the Palila depended." The
court found that the presence of the sheep constituted a harm because
(1) the eating habits of the sheep destroyed the mamane woodland and thus caused
habitat degradation that could result in extinction; (2) were the mouflon [sheep] to
continue eating the mamane, the woodland would not regenerate and the Palila
population would not recover to a point where it could be removed from the En-
dangered Species list.32
Through this holding, the court upheld the FWS definition of harm and yielded to the
authority of the Secretary because the Secretary is "entitled to deference if his regula-
tion is reasonable and not in conflict with the intent of Congress."33 The court also
reasoned that the Secretary's inclusion of habitat modification serves the overall pur-
pose of the Act which is "to provide a means whereby the ecosystems upon which
endangered species and threatened species depend may be conserved . . . ."' Con-
serving the Palila's woodland is also consistent with the legislative history of the poli-
cy. The Senate Reporter on the Act stated that "'Take' is defined in ... the broadest
possible manner to include every conceivable way in which a person can 'take' or
attempt to 'take' any fish or wildlife."35 Finally, the court looked to the reaction of
Congress to support its decision. Since Congress was aware of the judicial and codified
interpretation of harm when it amended the ESA in 1982 and did not change the defi-
nition of "take" so as to exclude habitat modification, Congress implied its acceptance
and satisfaction with the inclusion.36
Generally, commentators who agree that habitat modification is a harm recognize
the importance of a species' habitat in its recuperation and survival. Commentator
Keith Saxe states that "[w]hile hunting and predator control pose a direct and signifi-
cant threat, human population growth and economic development present a much
greater threat to wildlife species ... [by depriving] wildlife of essential habi-
28. Palila v. Hawaii Dept. of Land & Natural Resources, 852 F.2d 1106 (9th Cir. 1988).
29. 471 F. Supp. 985 (D. Haw. 1979).
30. 852 F.2d at 1107.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 1108, citing United States v. Riverside Bayview, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 131 (1985).
34. 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b) (1994).
35. S. Rep. No. 307, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1973), reprinted in 1973 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2989, 2995.
36. See Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616 (1987) (congressional inaction after inter-
pretation may be probative of approval).
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tat ...."" Commentators also rely on the legislative history, similar to the Palila IV
court. The original acts, amendments, and reauthorization support the concept that a
species' habitat is crucial to its recovery. Courts and commentators rely on sections
that broadly define conservation to include "habitat maintenance."3 Other sections
recognize the importance of habitat requiring that the Secretary use "present or threat-
ened destruction, modification, or curtailment of [a species'] habitat or range" in deter-
mining whether to list a species as threatened or endangered.39 Also, Congress direct-
ed the Secretary to designate "critical habitat" for any endangered or threatened species
for the purposes of § 7 of the Act to prevent federal agencies from using property in
ways that would prevent the species' recovery or increase the chance of extinction.'
The affirmative appearance of habitat within the statute evidences the intent of the
creators of the ESA to take account not only of the survival of the species, but also the
geographic territory that keeps the species existing. Finally, one commentator agreed
with the ESA's overall intent and purpose stiting that "[liaws which grant private
property rights in water and mineral resources with little or no consideration of the
public interest are a major cause of the enormous amount of environmental destruc-
tion ...." The Palila IV decision espouses this intent and effectively elevates habi-
tat conservation above individualized concerns.
B. Sweet Home II: Habitat Modification is a Right, Not a Harm
Recently, however, the DC Circuit "altered" its previous view that the FWS
regulation correctly included habitat modification as a harm42 and created a circuit
split in 1994 by finding the regulation unconstitutional in Sweet Home I1*43 In Sweet
Home II, several citizens' organizations concerned about over-regulation by govern-
ment and decreasing rights of private property owners sued the Secretary of Interior to
invalidate the FWS regulations under the ESA prohibition of taking endangered spe-
cies. The court decided that the FWS's definition of harm was "neither clearly autho-
rized by Congress nor a 'reasonable interpretation' of the statute," as required by
Chevron USA, Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council." The Sweet Home II court
found that the legislative history was ambiguous, not spelling out a congressional in-
tent of habitat modification to be a harm and not specifically including habitat modifi-
cation into the Act during the Reauthorization in 1982."s In addition, the Court found
the interpretation to be unreasonable by relying on the concept of noscitur a sociis (a
word is known by the company it keeps)." Harm, therefore, requires a more direct
action toward the animal within the meaning of the surrounding words (hunt, shoot,
37. Supra note 22, at 405.
38. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(3) (1994).
39. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a) (1994).
40. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(5)(b) (1994) (applying to actions by the federal government, not by indi-
vidual parties).
41. Michael C. Blumm, Public Choice Theory and the Public Lands: Why "'Multiple Use" Failed,
18 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 405, 406 (1993).
42. Sweet Home 1, 1 F.3d I (D.C. Cir. 1993).
43. Sweet Home 11, 17 F.3d 1463, 1464 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
44. Chevron USA, Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842-44 (1984), cited
in 17 F.3d at 1464.
45. 17 F.3d at 1467.
46. Jarecki v. G.D. Searle & Co., 367 U.S. 303, 307 (1961), cited in 17 F.3d at 1465.
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wound, kill).4 Finally, the court found this definition to be too broad, even encom-
passing a farmer who may be kept from harvesting crops.4 s
Commentators on this issue are plentiful. Most yield to the need for private
property owners' rights. In fact, writer Ike Sugg explains that "the essential point to
understand is that the [definition of harm has] been greatly expanded with deleterious
effect on human liberty."49 He suggests that the federal government, through the De-
partment of Agriculture could provide "funds for the acquisition of critical habitat
and... [cooperate] with landowners who desire to assist in the protection of endan-
gered species, but who are understandably unwilling to do so at excessive cost to
themselves."' This removes the responsibility from the property owner and permits
the owner to do with the property as she wishes. Finally, one commentator does not
believe in the viability of the ESA because it violates the Fifth Amendment. Com-
mentator Mark Pollot argues that if the inclusion of habitat modification in the defini-
tion of harm renders the property substantially less valuable, then the government has
taken the property unconstitutionally and owes the property owner compensation. 2
Sweet Home IH championed this reasoning leaving the question behind "harm" to Con-
gress.
IlL. THE NECESSARY STATUTORY REVISION
Both economists and environmentalists criticize the ESA but it remains the most
comprehensive act aimed at the goal of wildlife conservation and retains its original
design of sparing endangered and threatened species. This circuit split, however, jeop-
ardizes this goal. To bypass this problem, when reauthorizing the ESA, Congress
should alter § 1532 (19) of the statute to read as follows:
The term "take" means:
a. to harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, collect, or
b. to engage in any conduct that significantly modifies the habitat of an endangered
species, or
c. to attempt to engage in any of the above conduct.53
This reauthorization will have many positive effects. First, it will nullify the current
circuit split and uphold a FWS regulation judicially confirmed for many years. Second,
the reauthorization will push the ESA back toward its goal of conserving endangered
wildlife by recognizing the necessity of conserving the habitat of the species, not only
the species itself. Finally, the ESA will officially recognize that the great loss of our
species is primarily due to loss of habitat. The relatively small loss of economic oppor-
tunity in development cannot justify the profoundly wrong occurrence of loss of habitat
and of a species.' Congress will merely acknowledge the promise of conservation
47. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(19) (1994).
48. 17 F.3d at 1464-65.
49. Ike Sugg, Caught in the Act: Evaluating the ESA, Its Effects on Man & Prospects for Re-
form, 24 CUMBERLAND L. REv. 1, 35 (1993-94).
50. Id., citing 199 Cong. Rec. 30162 (1973).
51. Mark L. Pollot, GRAND THEFt & PETIT LARCENY: PROPERTY RIGHTS IN AMERICA 125 (1993).
52. Id.
53. See supra note 7 and accompanying text for current version of statute.
54. Nancy Kubasek notes that "[w]hile a few notable projects have been temporarily delayed or
modified, with a great deal of attendant publicity, almost ninety percent of consultations are disposed
of informally." Supra note 24, at 338.
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underlying the ESA and create stability surrounding "harm."
In the words of great naturalist Aldo Leopold, endangered species "depend for
their perpetuation on protection and a favorable environment. They need
'management'-the perpetuation of good habitat."5
Kristen M. Fletcher*
55. Aldo Leopold, Threatened Species, reprinted in THE RIVER OF THE MOTHER OF GOD 230,
231 (Susan L. Flader & J. Baird Callicot eds. 1991).
* B.A., Political Science and Spanish, Auburn University, 1993; J.D. Candidate, Notre Dame
Law School, 1996.
19951

